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The europeanisation of law v. national sovereignty
Since the inception of the European Union, the Member States have been subject to 
the process of Europeanisation. In the legal field this meant changes in national laws as 
they were influenced by European law, or the influence of European law on the Member 
States’ legal systems.1 On one hand this process has resulted in the harmonization of the 
Member States’ legislation, but on the other it has decreased their autonomy and sover-
eignty. It also recurrently causes conflicts between the Member States and the European 
authorities. Cases concerning State aid are an excellent example of such conflict, where 
Member States constantly attempt to preserve as much control as possible over the sup-
porting schemes. At the same time, the European Commission2 and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union3 tend to increase their supervisory power through a set of often 
controversial decisions and judgements. This article aims to provide a critical reflection 
on the CJEU and the EC’s extensive interpretation of State resources as a prerequisite 
of State aid in financial schemes by using the example of Polish green certificates and 
auction systems that support producers of renewable energy sources.4
Renewable energy sources in the European Union
In 2007 the Member States of the EU set a target to cut greenhouse gas emissions and 
to increase energy production from RES, as well as to improve the energy efficiency by 
1 A. Wróbel, Europeizacja polskiego prawa o  postępowaniu administracyjnym a  autonomia proce-
duralna państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, in Europeizacja prawa administracyjnego, ed. 
I. Rzucidło, Lublin 2011, p. 24.
2 Hereinafter: the EC.
3 Hereinafter: the CJEU.
4 Hereinafter: RES.
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20% by 2020.5 The targets were enacted in a legislation package called “2020 Climate 
and Energy Package” that includes, inter alia, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council,6 which set the definition of RES, mandatory targets and 
the principles concerning the production and supporting of energy from RES. More 
recently Member States have developed further targets, which include, inter alia, an 
increase of up to 27% of energy production from RES by 2030.
However, the starting costs of energy production from RES are much higher com-
pared to that from conventional sources and thus producers of RES energy would have 
difficulties in competing with conventional energy producers on a free market. Due to 
this market failure, the Member States are justified in creating support schemes that 
would enable RES producers to compete efficiently on the energy market. However, the 
support schemes cannot be granted arbitrarily since they have to meet the requirements 
set forth by EU law. Generally speaking, if the scheme fulfils the prerequisites of art. 
107(1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union,7 it is considered to be 
State aid and thus the EC has to be notified, which then decides whether or not to raise 
objections regarding the scheme. In practice there are exceptions to these rules, which 
entail that the EC does not have to be notified if aid meets certain requirements.8
The scope of the article
During the last two decades a lot of controversies have arisen over numerous schemes 
concerning financial aid for RES. One of the main issues was whether those schemes 
fulfil the prerequisites of Article 107(1) TFEU, concerning State aid. The most prob-
lematic point was the interpretation of the prerequisite that aid is granted “through 
State resources.” This article analyzes the CJEU jurisprudence concerning relevant State 
aid cases, as well as the EC decisions concerning RES financial aid schemes, to show 
the evolution of the definition of State resources and provide a critical analysis of the 
CJEU and the EC’s approach. Relevant cases are analyzed by first describing the facts 
and explaining the reasoning behind each judgement or decision. Thereafter, a  more 
general rule is synthesized and a critical application of the rule to supporting schemes 
is provided. 
5 For some Member States the threshold was set at a lower level.
6 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ 2009 L140/16 (hereinafter: Renewable 
Energy Directive).
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), OJ 2008, C115/47 
(hereinafter: TFEU).
8 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ 
2014 L187/1. 
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In order to show how difficult it can be to establish the existence of State resources 
in the supporting schemes, this article applies the CJEU and the EC reasoning to Pol-
ish green certificates and auction schemes for the four following reasons. Firstly, the 
EC has recently given a decision on the Polish green certificates scheme, which means 
it is the most recent ruling concerning these schemes.9 Secondly, the Polish authorities 
have already notified the EC of the auction system and this article provides predictions 
concerning the future decision. Thirdly, these schemes are considered as borderline cases, 
where it is not clear if they constitute State aid.10 Finally, there are numerous publica-
tions analyzing the Polish green certificates and auction schemes’ compatibility with 
State Aid provisions. The authors of the publications have come to contradictory con-
clusions and justifications as to the existence of State aid in those schemes. This article 
therefore summarizes those opinions and provides a critical reflection on the authors’ 
reasoning. 
The article does not analyze whether other prerequisites of State aid are fulfilled, since 
their fulfilment is clear and in general does not raise any controversies. Furthermore, 
analysis of whether the green certificates and auction schemes comply with art. 107(3) 
TFEU11 is beyond the scope of this article.
Polish RES supporting schemes
Legal framework
From 2005, the green certificates scheme was regulated by the Energy Law Act of 1997.12 
However, in 2011 the Polish Parliament started working on a new act that would redefine 
existing support schemes, introduce new ones, and collect all the regulation concerning 
RES into one, complex act. In 2015, the Polish Parliament passed the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act of 201513 that introduced a new auction system scheme. There were numer-
ous reasons for a gradual transition from using green certificates towards the auction 
system. The green certificates system supported mechanisms that could produce energy 
from RES at the lowest cost possible, rather than a more desired one, which could also 
9 Case SA.37345 (2015/N), Polish certificates of origin.
10 W. Kucharski, Czy systemy wsparcia dla energii z odnawialnych źródeł przewidziane w projekcie 
ustawy o  OZE (druk sejmowy nr 2604) można uznać za pomoc publiczną?, Lublin 2015, p.  7, 
http://sjlegal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ustawa-o-oze-2015-om%C3%B3wienie-W.
Kucharski-Lublin-2015-r.pdf 21.10.2016].
11 The compatibility of those schemes with the Article 107(3) TFEU is well presented in the ar-
ticle by Z.Z. Romanowska, Can support systems regarding renewable energy (Parliamentary paper 
no. 2604) be considered as state aid?, “Przegląd Prawa Ochrony Środowiska” 2015, no. 2.
12 Dz.U. 2006 no. 89 item 625.
13 Dz.U. 2015 item 478 (hereinafter: Renewable Energy Sources Act).
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produce clean energy but for a higher price.14 Another issue was the increasing oversup-
ply of the green certificates on the market, which had a negative impact on their prices. 
Green certificates
The Polish green certificates system is based on certificates of origin. Producers of energy 
from RES obtain green certificates for the energy that they have produced from the 
President of the Polish Energy Regulatory Office,15 and the more energy they produce 
the more green certificates they obtain. Green certificates can then be sold on the Polish 
Power Exchange or through a private contract. At the same time, the major energy sup-
pliers are obliged to purchase a certain number of green certificates every year. Instead of 
buying green certificates, energy suppliers may also pay a substitution fee collected and 
managed by a public body called The National Fund for Environmental Protection and 
Water Management. The substitution fee is used by the fund to finance environmental 
projects in Poland. The Polish green certificates scheme does not fix a minimum or maxi-
mum price for a green certificate. 
The auction system
The new auction system, which the EC prefers over the green certificates scheme,16 was 
introduced by the Renewable Energy Act that replaces the green certificates system for 
new RES producers. Producers that were operating before the creation of the auction 
system may still operate under the green certificates scheme until 2030. The Auction 
system introduces a complicated financial scheme to support RES producers, based on 
auctions that are organized by PURE. RES producers bid the amount of energy and the 
desired price. PURE sets the maximum price for the energy, which cannot be exceeded, 
as well as the amount of energy that will be put up for auction. The producer that bids 
the lowest price for selling the energy wins the auction. Different auctions are organized 
depending on the energy source and its power. RES producers that win the auction sell 
the energy for the price that they bid to the ‘obliged sellers,’ who are mainly energy sup-
pliers. If the market price of the energy that is sold by obliged sellers is lower than the 
price paid to RES producers, then the sellers are entitled to compensation. The financial 
source of the compensation comes from the RES fee imposed on the end consumers. 
The government has created a special institution – OREO S.A. – which is responsible 
for the distribution of the RES fee from the end customers to the obliged sellers.
14 Z.Z. Romanowska, op. cit., p. 255.
15 Hereinafter: PURE.
16 Communication form the Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection 
and energy 2014–2020, OJ 2014 C 200/1.
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The existence of state resources  
in green certificates and auction systems.  
A critical reflection on CJEU jurisprudence and EC decisions
State resources as a prerequisite of state aid
According to Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market, unless 
otherwise provided in Treaties. Therefore, based on Article 107(1) TFEU and the CJEU 
jurisprudence, four prerequisites of State aid may be established. Those are: intervention 
by a State or through State resources, advantage on a selective basis, actual or potential 
distortion of competition, and an actual or potential effect of the on trade between 
Member States. Since it has already been established that green certificates and auction 
systems clearly meet all the prerequisites of State aid other than intervention through 
State resources, this article elaborates on the first prerequisite of State aid.
Neither hard law nor soft law provide a clear definition of State resources. In general, 
the prerequisite is fulfilled if there is a direct or indirect transfer of public resources.17 
State resources can be interpreted as resources that belong to the State, a local govern-
ment unit, or public or private companies controlled by the State.18 It is also important 
to note that the transfer of State resources cannot be understood only as the transfer of 
some kind of advantage, such as a financial grant. The prerequisite is also fulfilled if the 
State loses State resources in a way that constitutes a selective advantage for a beneficiary, 
such as a tax deduction or debt cancellation.19 One of the most important CJEU rulings 
that dealt with meeting the State resources prerequisite was the PreussenElektra case, 
which became a basis for further analysis of RES support schemes. The case concerned 
a financial scheme that was based on an obligation imposed by the German legislature 
on transmission and distribution system operators to purchase all energy from RES 
producers connected to their network for a fixed price higher than the market price. The 
CJEU ruled that this obligation imposed on private entities to purchase energy for such 
a fixed price involves neither direct nor indirect State resources.20 The Court stated that 
the fact that the obligation was imposed by the German legislature in a statute meant 
that State aid was not possible. The CJEU has also ruled out the argument that such an 
obligation would decrease the revenues gained by undertakings subject to provisions of 
17 C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG vs. Schleswag AG (hereinafter: PreussenElektra, item 58). 
18 C. Koenig, J. Kuhling, EC control of aid granted through State resources, “European State Aid Law 
Quarterly” 2002, no. 1, p. 8.
19 C-518/13 Eventech Ltd. v. Parking Adjudicator (hereinafter: Eventech, item 33).
20 PreussenElektra, item 58.
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the statute, which would in turn decrease the State’s income from taxes. The Court stated 
that such a consequence is an inherent feature of such a legislative provision and cannot 
be regarded as constituting a means of granting a particular advantage at the expense of 
the State.21 The undoubted importance of PreussenElektra is shown by the impact that 
it had on States in terms of creating support schemes that would shift the burden of fi-
nancing RES to private parties and, at the same time, not fulfill the prerequisites of State 
Aid. However, the liberal approach taken in PreussenElektra was later narrowed down by 
both the CJEU and the EC expanding the definition of State resources. 
The following criteria for establishing the existence of State resources, created by the 
CJEU and the EC, will be further analyzed, applied to green certificates or auction sys-
tems, and treated to critical reflection:
– the nature of a certificate of origin – the green certificates system,
– the creation of an alternative for payment to a private entity – the green cer-
tificates system,
– state control over private funds – green certificates and auction systems.
The green certificate – a thin line between state resources and a document
The approach to the origin of green certificates was not consistent throughout the years 
and evolved mostly in the EC decisions. In the early decisions concerning green certifi-
cates schemes the EC ruled that certificates as such are not a State resource but rather 
an official documentation that states how much energy from RES a given entity had 
produced. This approach was taken by the EC, inter alia, in the cases concerning the 
UK green certificates system22 and the Swedish green certificates system.23 In its early 
approach, the EC compared green certificates to the scheme presented in the Presussen- 
Elektra case. The EC explained that an obligation is placed on private parties and the sole 
purpose of using green certificates is to show the quantity of energy produced from RES. 
Furthermore, the EC stated that no State resources are involved in such a scheme and 
there is no loss of revenue for the State.24 However, this liberal approach was drastically 
changed by more recent judgements and EC decisions. In a case concerning a Dutch 
scheme of tradable nitrogen oxides emission rights,25 the Court ruled that if the State 
provides documents free of charge that reflect the quantity of emission and which can 
later be sold, then this fulfills the prerequisite of State resources. Although the Dutch 
scheme in the NOx case did not support RES producers, the transmission documents 
used in the scheme are in principle identical to green certificates as such. Entities that 
21 Ibidem, items 61–62.
22 Case N 504/2000, British Renewable Obligation I, OJ 2002, C 30/15.
23 Case N 789/2002, Swedish Green Certificates, OJ 2003, C 120/8.
24 Case N 504/2000, British Renewable Obligation I, OJ 2002, C 30/15, p. 12.
25 C-279/08 P Commission v. Netherlands (“Dutch NOx trading scheme”) (hereinafter: NOx).
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produced more NOx than the amount set by law were obliged to obtain a certain number 
of transmission documents or to decrease the NOx production, or both. The transmis-
sion documents were offered by companies with a level of NOx production below the 
threshold set by the regulation on a special market. The reasoning of the Court was that 
the State creates an asset and a market on which this asset can be traded. By doing this 
it gives it a certain value that is transferred to the beneficiary of the aid free of charge. 
Further reasoning is that since those documents have a material value, they can be sold 
by the State to beneficiaries in a tender or an auction procedure. The fact that they are 
given something free of charge instead of using a tender or an auction procedure causes 
a loss to the State, and they therefore constitutes State resources.26 Identical reasoning 
was applied by the EC to the Romanian green certificates scheme.27 Therefore, it was 
predictable that in the most recent decision issued by the EC, the Polish green certifi-
cates system is also considered to be State Aid.28 It should be pointed out that some 
Polish authors claimed that Polish green certificates will not be considered as State aid, 
given the reasoning that stood behind the EC practice set in the UK and the Swedish 
decision.29 However, given the more recent EC decisions and CJEU judgements, which 
were already available at the time those articles were published, this argument cannot 
be accepted. 
The outcome of the decision concerning Polish green certificates was as predictable 
as it was wrong. The approach taken by the CJEU in the NOx case, and further deci-
sions that followed from that judgement, reveal there is a clear misunderstanding of the 
nature of a green certificate. Although the form of the certificate in fact differs from 
the approach taken by PreussenElektra, the outcome is essentially identical. In Preussen- 
Elektra the financial support was granted by private entities at a fixed price imposed by 
a German statute. In the green certificates scheme the aid is also paid by private entities, 
and it is imposed through national legislation, but the difference is that the price is not 
fixed, relying rather on the market price of a certificate. The difference therefore is the 
creation of an extra step in the scheme. In PreussenElektra the State grants the right to 
obtain financial support from a private entity, while in the green certificates scheme the 
State grants the right to obtain a certificate that details the amount of energy produced, 
which is converted to financial support from a private entity. Thus the source of the fi-
nancial support in PreussenElektra does not come from a statute itself, but from resources 
taken from private entities and given to RES producers. In turn, in the green certificates 
26 NOx, item 111.
27 Case SA.33134 (2011/N), Romanian Green Certificates, OJ 2011, C 244/2.
28 Case SA.37345 (2015/N), Polish certificates of origin, items 137–147.
29 D. Kobiałko, Czy systemy wsparcia dla energii z  odnawialnych źródeł przewidziane w  projek-
cie ustawy o OZE (druk sejmowy nr 2604) można uznać za pomoc publiczną?, Warszawa 2015, 
p.  12, http://www.m.cire.pl/pliki/2/2877kobialkod3miejsce.pdf [access: 22.10.2016]; Z.Z. Ro-
manowska, op. cit., p 264.
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scheme the source of aid are resources taken from private entities and given to RES 
producers, and not a certificate as such. The argument provided by the CJEU and EC, 
namely that the certificates could be sold through an auction or a tender procedure and 
thus they would not constitute aid, is therefore erroneous since the green certificate is 
not a source of aid. It is also arguable whether introducing such a scheme would even be 
possible and effective and thus it may lead to the conclusion that, in order to escape from 
the State aid regime, States would have to choose less effective systems to support RES 
producers30. Furthermore, the approach taken by the CJEU and EC can be stretched 
to such an extent that in every case concerning financial schemes the prerequisite of 
State resources will be met. If the CJEU states that the State loses its resources because 
it creates a certificate which has a value and gives it away for free, then one may argue 
that in PreussenElektra the State loses its resources as well because it could have issued 
such certificates, given them value, and then sold them through a tender procedure or 
an auction. It seems that this reasoning takes the CJEU approach to absurd conclusions. 
However, there are justified doubts whether the CJEU would give the same ruling on 
PreussenElektra today.
The creation of a sanction system related with the green certificates scheme
Throughout the European Union, Member States have created schemes based on certifi-
cates of origin that involved penalties for not acquiring a certain amount of certificates. 
The issue of paying a fine for not fulfilling the obligation to acquire green certificates was 
analyzed by the EC in the UK green certificates decision. The EC stated indirectly that 
a fine as such does not constitute a loss in State resources but that the problem lay in 
applying rules concerning State control over aid (this issue is discussed in section 3.4 of 
this article)31. The penalty in the UK system was called a buy-out price and the resources 
granted through the fines were later redistributed to RES producers. An identical ap-
proach was taken by the EC in a case concerning Swedish certificates.32 
However, once again the CJEU took a more restrictive approach to the existence of 
State resources in the NOx case, where it stated that transmission documents are an al-
ternative to paying a fine and therefore they reduce the State’s resources.33 It is difficult to 
agree with the Court that a fine whose value exceeds the value of the certificate itself can 
be considered as an alternative. An obligation without a sanction is called a lex imperfecta 
in legal jargon, and in practice it is at least more difficult to enforce. Therefore, in order 
30 W. Sauter, H. Vedder, State aid and selectivity in the context of emissions trading: comment on the 
NOx Case, “European Law Review” 2012, vol. 37, p. 334.
31 Case N 504/2000, British Renewable Obligation I, OJ 2002, C 30/15, p. 12.
32 Case N 789/2002, Swedish Green Certificates, OJ 2003, C 120/8, p. 5.
33 T.M. Rusche, EU Renewable Electricity Law and Policy -From National Targets to a Common 
Market, Cambridge 2015, p. 102.
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to escape the scope of article 107(1) TFEU, the Member States would have to create an 
ineffective scheme. The view that a green certificate is an alternative to a sanction cannot 
be accepted either, since the sanction could not exist without an obligation. A sanction 
for not fulfilling an obligation is an inevitable part of the scheme, just as a decrease in tax 
revenues was in the PreussenElektra case34. The necessity of providing a sanction in the 
green certificates schemes to ensure the effectiveness of the system has been confirmed 
by the CJEU in a recent case concerning the compatibility of the Swedish green certifi-
cates system with art. 34 TFEU35.
In the articles concerning the Polish green certificates scheme, two opposite views 
concerning the existence of a fine may be established. One view shares the Court’s rea-
soning expressed in the NOx case36, while others take an opposite approach37. Their 
opposite argument is based on the fact that the resources obtained through penalties are 
used to finance other purposes that do not concern RES producers and thus they are 
not part of a scheme. Although I agree that imposing a sanction for not fulfilling the 
obligation to obtain certificates does not involve State resources, I believe that the way 
that the money obtained through payment is spent is irrelevant. This particular sanction 
of paying a fine is inevitably correlated with the green certificates scheme and could not 
exist without it. Therefore, the way that the resources obtained from penalties are spent 
does not have an impact on the fact that such a sanction does not involve State resources, 
since it cannot be considered as an alternative to obtaining a certificate. 
State control over aid 
According to the well-established CJEU jurisprudence, if the resources – although fund-
ed from private funds – are controlled or distributed by an entity established by the State, 
then they are considered to be aid granted through State resources.38 This approach had 
been already taken by the CJEU before ruling on renewable energy support schemes. In 
Ladbroke Racing LTD, the Court ruled that even though the aid was not permanently 
held by the Treasury, the fact that it constantly remained under public control, and was 
therefore available to the competent national authorities, it was sufficient for it to be 
categorized as State resources.39 In the more recent Essent case, the CJEU developed and 
34 PreussenElektra, item 62.
35 C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, item 116.
36 W. Szopiński, Czy systemy wsparcia dla energii z odnawialnych źródeł przewidziane w projekcie 
ustawy o odnawialnych źródłach energii można uznać za pomoc publiczną?, 2015, pp. 10–11, http://
www.cire.pl/pliki/2/szopinskiw2miejsce.pdf [access: 15.03.2017].
37 D. Kobiałko, op. cit., p. 13; Z.Z Romanowska, op. cit., p. 259.
38 See C-83/98 P French Republic v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd and Commission (hereinafter: Ladbroke 
Racing Ltd); C-482/99 French Republic v. Commission; C-206/06 Essent Network Noord (here-
inafter: Essent); C-262/12 Vent De Colère and others (hereinafter: Vent de Colere).
39 Ladbroke Racing Ltd, item 50.
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clarified criteria that establish whether a scheme in which the burden to finance aid lies 
with private entities constitutes State aid.40 The case concerned a financial scheme where 
so-called “stranded costs,” which were borne by a public energy company SEM during 
an investment period, were recompensed through increased electricity prices transferred 
to the end customer. The aid was based on the Dutch Transitional Law, which imposed 
a charge on the end customers, while the transfer of money was supervised by the State. 
According to the Court, the State supervision over the money flow distinguished the 
Essent case from Pearle case,41 where the State could not exercise any control over the 
aid and the purpose of the aid was not established by law.42 Therefore, the following cri-
teria may be established, based on the Essent judgement, that determine whether State 
resources are involved in a scheme: 1) the source and the purpose of the aid are defined 
by law, 2) the State exercises direct or indirect control over the aid, 3) appointment of 
a private or public body by the State to manage a State resource.43 This approach nar-
rows down the criteria from the PreussenElektra judgement and is applied in the more 
recent Vent de Colere case, in which French law imposed an obligation to buy electricity 
produced from a wind power for a fixed price which was higher than the market price 
of that energy.44 The French scheme resembled the one presented in PreussenElektra; 
however, it granted the State the right to supervise the money flow of the aid, and im-
posed an obligation on the State to cover the negative difference between the costs borne 
by the RES producers and the amount of the aid collected from the private entities.45 
Although in my opinion the State’s supervision over the aid is in itself not sufficient to 
fulfil the prerequisite of State resources, the obligation imposed on the State to cover 
a negative difference clearly fulfils this prerequisite. 
Therefore, financial schemes are considered aid imputable to the State and granted 
through its resources due to the sole fact that the State holds even indirect control over 
the distribution of those resources. This interpretation of State resources is relevant for 
both Polish green certificates and auction systems. In the green certificates system, the 
funds collected from penalties are controlled by a public fund, while in the auction sys-
tem the redistribution of so-called RES charges is controlled by a public body.
In my opinion, the interpretation of article 107(1) TFEU that is presented by both the 
CJEU and EC stretches the definition to such an extent that if a State decides to trans-
fer the burden to finance aid to private parties, in order not to fall under the scope of 
40 F.R. Carmona, The Feed-in Tariffs Entanglement: A  Comparative Study of the Analytical Ap-
proaches Followed by the EU and WTO Judiciary Bodies regarding Renewable Energy Subsidies, 
“Legal Issues of Economic Integration” 2016, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 223.
41 C-345/02 Pearle and Others.
42 Essent, item 72.
43 Essent, items 45, 66, 69–70, 72.
44 Vent de Colere, items 21–37.
45 Ibidem, item 26.
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Article 107(1) TFEU, it seems that it does not have any instruments to assure the proper 
distribution of those resources and therefore it cannot vouch for the effectiveness of the 
aid. The broad scope of State resources leaves the following dilemma. If the State grants 
aid financed by private resources, it either has to agree to fall under the scope of Article 
107(1) TFEU, with all of the legal consequences that entails, or it has to waive the right 
to efficiently supervise the aid. Since Member States finance RES producers in order 
to comply with the obligations under Directive 2009/28/EC, the choice to resign from 
the right to supervise the aid could expose them to the unwanted risk of not fulfilling 
their obligations under the Directive. I do not find the argument that exercising public 
control over private funds renders them available to the public authorities convincing 
enough to qualify it as a fulfilment of the State resource prerequisite. An even wider ap-
proach was taken by the EC in the PreussenElektra judgment, where it stated that it is 
immaterial whether the aid is financed directly through the state resources or indirectly 
through private funds. According to the EC, such a distinction would make it possible 
to circumvent the State Aid rules and it would jeopardize the attainment of the objec-
tives of the Treaty46. Therefore, according to the more economic approach presented by 
the EC, which focuses more on the effects of the scheme, rather than on the wording 
of Article 107(1), the scheme presented in PreussenElektra would be considered as State 
Aid. Although this approach cannot be accepted, as it directly contradicts Article 107(1) 
TFEU, those financial schemes can still be challenged as contradictory to Article 34 
TFEU. Under this provision, all measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions on imports, including any national measure which is capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are prohibited.47 For 
these reasons I find that both the CJEU and EC actions which broaden the scope of 
the State resources prerequisite to be wrong. Instead of bending the definition of State 
aid, which unnecessarily causes different aid schemes to fall under Article 107 TFEU, 
with all the consequences this entails, other measures can be successfully taken to pre-
vent States from distorting competition. It needs to be pointed out that arguments for 
and against broadening the definition of State resources have consequences that reach 
much further than renewable energy schemes, and thus cannot be limited to a discussion 
between environmentalists and free-markets supporters.48 Such practices extend the EC 
and CJEU’s control over the Member States in a way that does not have any reflection 
in any hard law, and it also compromises the efficacy of the financial schemes with an 
46 R. Callaerts, State Aid for the Production of Electricity from Renewable Energy Resources, “Euro-
pean Energy and Environmental Law Review” 2015, vol. 24, p. 21.
47 C-573/12, Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten; Joined cases C-204 to 208/12 Essent Bel-
gium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt.
48 T.M. Rusche, op. cit., p. 111.
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extensive control, which could be more proportionally assured by applying Article 34 
TFEU instead of stretching the definition of State resources to the maximum.49 
Conclusions
Tim Rusche very accurately described the PreussenElektra judgement as a  “Pyrrhic 
victory.”50 Indeed, although the judgement encouraged the creation of financial schemes 
that would not fall under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, soon the EC and CJEU 
abruptly deflated the Member States’ optimism by gradually expanding the scope of the 
definition of aid granted through State resources. It is actually astonishing how far the 
jurisprudence went – from a very simple term to the very narrow conditions set by the 
Essent case concerning State control over the funds, or by proposing unrealistic tender 
conditions concerning tradable rights to emissions in the NOx case. However, given 
the Court’s jurisprudence and the EC decisions, it is certain that both Polish green 
certificates and the auction system will be considered State aid, this does not preclude 
the necessity for expressing strong opposition to the practice of misrepresenting the 
definition of State resources. At the end of the day, this practice will not only affect RES 
support schemes but the whole State aid system, causing unnecessary bureaucracy and 
inefficiency instead of supporting and promoting more efficient solutions.
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summary
Controversies Concerning the Interpretation of State Resources  
as a Prerequisite of State Aid: an Illustration Using the Example  
of Polish Green Certificates and the Auction System
The process of Europeanisation in the legal field results in various conflicts between the 
Member States and European authorities. Cases concerning State aid are an example of 
such a conflict, where on one hand Member States want to preserve control over vari-
ous supporting schemes and on the other the European Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union through a set of judgements and decisions increase their 
supervisory power over the supporting schemes. The European jurisprudence tend to 
stretch the scope of State aid by expanding the definition of State resources, which is one 
of its prerequisites. Applying of such a broad definition of State resources to Polish green 
certificates scheme and the auction scheme shows negative results of this approach that 
not only decreases the efficiency of the Renewable Energy Sources supporting schemes 
but that has a negative reflection on the whole State aid system.
Keywords: State aid, State resources, green certificates, auction, renewable energy sources
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